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A group of scholars at The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard
College has developed a plan to establish a nationwide system of commu-
nity development banks (CDBs). The urgent need for such a measure is
reflected in the Clinton/Gore proposal to create a network of 100 commu-
nity development banks. The creation of banks in communities lacking such
institutions is critical to the revitalization of many communities, and it
enhances the general welfare of the country. 
The crux of this paper is that the primary function of the financial structure
is to advance the capital development of the economy—to increase the real
productive capacity and wealth-producing ability of the economy. It is
assumed that capital development is fostered via the provision of a broad
range of financial services to various segments of the U.S. economy, includ-
ing consumers, small and large businesses, retailers, developers, and all lev-
els of government. Moreover, the existing financial structure is particularly
weak in servicing small and start-up businesses, and in servicing certain
consumer groups. Finally, this problem has become more acute because of a
decrease in the number of independent financing alternatives and the rise in
the size distribution of financing sources, which have increased the financial
system’s bias toward larger transactions. 
The primary goals of the CDBs are to deliver credit, payment, and savings
opportunities to communities not well served by banks, and to provide
financing throughout a designated area for businesses too small to attract
the interest of the investment banking and normal commercial banking
communities. Community development banks are premised on the notion
that a critical function of the financial system is not being adequately per-
formed by existing institutions for well-defined segments of the population:
low-income citizens, inner-city minorities, and entrepreneurs who seek
modest financing for small businesses. 
A fully funded and mature CDB would be expected to provide many core
banking services, including: 
– a payment system and secure outlets for savings
– the financing of housing, consumer debt, and student loans
– commercial banking services
– investment banking services
– asset management advice and special accounts
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an equitable payment system for the bottom quintile of the population,
which is generally denied access to checking accounts and credit cards.
More attention should be given to this payment function of banking.
Others have argued that commercial banks should be required to offer
“life-line accounts,” but this represents an unnecessary cost that commer-
cial banks can ill afford at the present time. 
But by the same token, the importance of bringing the bottom quintile of
the population into the banking system without burdening them with exces-
sive costs associated with a “fee for services” payment mechanism is also
recognized. For example, the current checking component of the payment
system is too expensive for commercial banks to provide the small accounts
needed by those with low incomes, and thus cannot serve as the basis for a
universal payment system available to all. The CDB system, however, can
be designed so that a profitable payment system is incorporated within the
package of services provided to the community.
The funding, regulation, and supervision of CDBs can be carried out most
effectively by the creation of a federal bank for CDBs. The Federal Bank for
Community Development Banks (FBCDB) will be the clearing bank, the
central bank, the correspondent bank, the link with financial markets, and
the supervising authority for the community development banks. It will
provide up to 50% of the equity for the community development banks,
and as an investor will have access to the books of these banks. This
FBCDB will also have the responsibility of overseeing the development of
the professional staff of the CDBs. 
The Clinton/Gore proposal for community development banks called for
some 100 such banks over the next four years. Even if each of these banks
has assets of $100 million by 1996, their holdings would total only $10 bil-
lion. These institutions are not to be viewed as a significant countercyclical
force, nor as a major factor in the growth of the economy. They are to be
seen as a set of institutions that fill a gap in the ongoing institutional struc-
ture. They may well provide part of the institutional setting in which a cli-
mate of opportunity replaces stagnation for many segments of the popula-
tion. 
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of the U.S. economy is likely to be among the
priorities on President Clinton’s agenda.
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard
College has an ongoing project, under the
guidance of Hyman P. Minsky, Distinguished
Scholar at the Institute, on “The Reconstitu-
tion of the Financial Structure.” In conjunc-
tion with this project and in response to the
Clinton/Gore proposal for the creation of a
network of community development banks,
scholars at the Institute have developed a
concept for such a proposal detailed in the
pages that follow. In this concept proposal,
the authors provide the rationale for—and
views on the structure, chartering, organiza-
tion, financing, and supervision of—a nation-
wide system of community development
banks. In addition, an attempt is made to
assess the experience of the existing pilot
models of CDBs and the potential problems
that these models might present for a nation-
wide strategy. 
Recent troubles plaguing a wide spectrum of
financial institutions indicate a need for fun-
damental reform. Is it sheer coincidence that
the problems afflicting S&Ls, banks, insur-
P r e f a c e
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ance companies, and other financial agents are occurring simultaneously?
The evolution of these pandemic crises has produced a financial system
much different than the one created via the Banking Act of 1935, which
yielded a very long period—almost fifty years—of financial stability in U.S.
history. Among the troubling results of this financial evolution and innova-
tion have been the disenfranchisement of many poor communities from the
financial system: many low-income people have little access to financial ser-
vices. Community development banks are a bold and serious initiative
addressing the main function of a financial system—that is, the capital
development of the economy. But it is a proposal that is focused on specific
areas that are not presently well served by existing financial institutions. 
The crux of the Institute’s mission is to improve the human condition via
the discipline of economics. I believe that the following proposal on com-
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I. Introduction
The Clinton/Gore proposal for the creation of
a network of 100 community development
banks (CDBs) to revitalize communities is
bold, and will contribute to the success of the
U.S. economy. Banks are essential institutions
in any community, and the establishment of a
bank is often a prerequisite for the investment
process. For this reason, the creation of banks
in communities lacking such institutions is
important to the welfare of these communities. 
The vitality of the American economy depends
on the continual creation of new and initially
small firms. Because it is in the public interest
to foster the creation of new entrants into
industry, trade, and finance, it is also in the
public interest to have a set of strong, indepen-
dent, profit-seeking banking institutions that
specialize in financing smaller businesses. 
When market forces fail to provide a service
that is needed and potentially profitable, it is
appropriate for government to help create the
market. Community development banks fall
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
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start-up costs, the banks are expected to be profitable. 
The primary perspective of this concept paper is that the main function of the
financial structure is to advance the capital development of the economy—to
increase the real productive capacity and wealth-producing ability of the
economy. The second assumption is that capital development is encouraged
by the provision of a broad range of financial services to various segments of
the U.S. economy, including consumers, small and large businesses, retailers,
developers, and all levels of government. The third is that the existing finan-
cial structure is particularly weak in servicing small and start-up businesses,
and in servicing certain consumer groups. The fourth is that this problem has
become more acute because of a decrease in the number of independent
financing alternatives and a rise in the size distribution of financing sources,
which have increased the financial system’s bias toward larger transactions.
These are assumptions that appear to be supported by the evidence: they are
also incorporated in other proposals that advance programs to develop com-
munity development banking.
II. Rationale for Community Development Banks
The greatest danger to the community bank concept may be a lack of clarity
in the concept. The primary goals of the CDBs are to deliver credit, payment,
and savings opportunities to communities not well served by banks, and to
provide financing throughout a designated area for businesses too small to
attract the interest of the investment banking and normal commercial bank-
ing communities. 
The community service aspects of the banks involve the payment mechanism
and the savings facility. These require none of the “underwriting and judg-
ment” skills of the banker who takes risks. An assumption underlying the
lack of credit facilities assertion is that there are “bankable risks” and feasible
“equity investments” in distressed communities that involve dollar amounts
too small for the established banking community. Even “small” commercial
banks customarily handle asset and liability denominations that are larger
than those typically generated in low-income communities.
There are six identifiable banking functions:
1 . Payment system for check cashing and clearing, and credit and debit cards.
2 . Secure depositories for savings and transaction balances.
3 . Household financing for housing, consumer debts, and student loans.
Community Development Banking
Public Policy Brief 10
PPB No. 3 new  2/17/99  3:19 PM  Page 10Community Development Banking
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
4 . Commercial banking services for loans, payroll services, and advice.
5 . Investment banking services for determining the appropriate liability 
structure for the assets of a firm, and placing these liabilities.
6 . Asset management and advice for households.
This list is not meant to imply that every bank should perform all of these
functions. The argument for community development banks is that one or
more of the above functions is not being adequately performed by existing
institutions for well-defined segments of the population: low-income citizens;
inner-city minorities; and entrepreneurs who seek modest financing for small
businesses. Furthermore, this troubling situation has been aggravated by a
variety of problems that financial institutions of all kinds have faced over the
past years.
The 1980s and 1990s have seen a decline in the number of independent
financing outlets for businesses, and a shift in the size distribution of banks
and savings and loan institutions in favor of larger banks. Banks now find it
increasingly unprofitable to serve many parts of the population, particularly
the smallest enterprises. Our proposal would increase the supply of short-
term credit to small business.
One aim of the CDBs should be to seek out projects that promise to be prof-
itable but are not being financed because of their small size, their perceived
riskiness, or the “inexperience” of the prospective management. Theory and
evidence suggest that commercial banks are reluctant to make loans to firms
that have not already established close relations with a loan officer. Thus,
firms that have been denied access to credit due to perceived inexperience
find it difficult to establish the required ties. This problem is aggravated when
the firms are small and, hence, lack market power.
The objective of the CDB is to be profitable, and it will be as successful as the
projects it finances are profitable: this will dictate close supervision of its cus-
tomers. Government seed money may be involved, but the government’s
investment in the CDB system should be viewed as a profit-making invest-
ment. Thus, if the Congress mandates subsidized financing by these banks,
the Congress should budget the expected cost of the mandated spending as a
subsidy to the endeavor.
Capital development of the country in general and of depressed regions in
particular requires a broad range of financial services in order to raise effec-
tive demand and revitalize the regional and national economies. In other
words, “capital development” is the primary concern, but this does not solely
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mean the provision of investment finance. The whole community needs finan-
cial reform: this includes the provision of financial services to all segments of
the economy, including consumers, small and large business, retailers, devel-
opers, and all levels of government. The CDB proposal will address most of
these; it will ignore finance of big business and of federal and state govern-
ment. However, we need to emphasize that the CDB proposal cannot, by
itself, be viewed as the panacea that will solve all of the problems afflicting
economically depressed communities. 
III. Assessment of Community Development Bank Experience
The existing models of CDBs provide a useful starting point for the develop-
ment of a nationwide strategy. However, we believe that there are significant
problems with existing CDBs (and with proposals based on these).
Consequently, we do not recommend that these models be applied without
modification as part of a nationwide strategy. Community development
banks have been successful when they have been able to attract deposits from
outside the community while using the funds for residential mortgage loans. 
The most successful community development bank, and the oldest, is the
Shorebank Corporation of Chicago, a holding company that includes a bank,
a real estate development corporation, a small venture capital firm, and the
Neighborhood Institute, which offers among its services low-income-housing
development, remedial education, and vocational training. On the asset side,
its greatest success has been residential mortgages, typically made on the con-
dition that the structures be renovated and improved. The loan loss ratio at
Shorebank in 1990 was 0.46% and in 1991 was 0.67%. The key to its suc-
cess is residential housing: as Ronald Grzywinski of Shorebank acknowl-
edged, “the principal small business of Shorebank was quite simply housing.”  
The other CDB commonly referred to as a potential model is the Southern
Development Bancorporation, parent of Elk Horn Bank & Trust Company
in Arkansas. It uses a subsidiary called the Good Faith Fund, which offers
loans from $500 to a few thousand dollars to low-income people trying to
start a business. The activities in small-business loans have been less success-
ful, as have attempts to provide low-cost checking and savings deposits for
the community residents.
On the liability side of the balance sheet, the most important innovation of
Shorebank has been Development Deposits, funds gathered from outside the
community, from institutions and individuals who share the goals of the cor-
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half of the deposit base at Shorebank. Some depositors accept below-market
rates to subsidize Shorebank’s work, but generally these deposits offer market
rates of interest. Rehabilitation certificates of deposit, which typically pay
200 basis points below the market interest rates, make up 4.1% of
Shorebank’s deposits. Thus, the banks are subsidized to some extent by phi-
lanthropists and socially conscious people who are willing to accept a lower
rate of return on their money in exchange for doing something they consider
an important contribution to society. This asset/liability structure, which also
carries federal deposit insurance, has been the key to the success of the corpo-
r a t i o n .
Shorebank’s principal weakness is that, although it pays for itself, it is not
profitable enough to convince other entrepreneurs with capital to imitate its
success; its returns to its owners have been lower than average for a bank its
size. Thus, it should not serve as a model for a nationwide system of CDBs.
IV.  Potential Problems with a Nationwide Strategy
The strengths of existing community development banks may turn out to be
weaknesses if current policy is followed as a national strategy. Attracting
funds from the outside is important for particular CDBs, but to establish a
nationwide group of banks and then expect them to compete for funds from
the “socially conscious” public would be self-defeating. It is not a viable long-
run strategy to promote as a national policy the transfer, for example, of the
“socially conscious” funds of New York City to rural Alabama (or vice
versa). A national policy should encourage local markets for the CDB liabili-
ties just as it encourages local markets for the CDB assets. This will help to
ensure that local consumers receive the broad range of financial services
needed to encourage capital development of the community, particularly
credit services and transaction services. The banks of a nationwide system of
CDBs cannot rely on local short-term loans as a primary asset while the pri-
mary liabilities are external funds, because this ignores the payment and sav-
ing functions of the local community.
A key aspect of Shorebank is that its neighborhood was still perhaps two-
thirds middle and working class when the bank came into existence. CDB
managers do not claim that their model would work in the very worst ghet-
tos. A strategy based on existing models would, therefore, neglect those at the
very bottom of the economic ladder, who presumably need the most help.
Reliance on external funds ignores the necessary provision of bank services to
Community Development Banking
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providing financial services in the community.
Another important factor is that the existing CDBs, because they are unique
in their communities, face little competition for their core business. When
they do face competition, they often do well, especially in residential loans.
Shorebank discovered that its creation of the rehabilitation loan generated a
demand from consumers for other banks to also provide rehabilitation loans.
This is an example of the market working to the benefit of both business and
consumer. However, in a nationwide system, existing banks (under pressure
of competition) can be expected to respond and provide competition for the
C D B s .
Because the CDBs are not intended to be welfare programs but to provide
services to the community’s residents, they must meet the long-run market
tests of profitability. Aside from the service aspect, community development
banks will improve the well-being of our citizens by increasing opportunities
directly for potential entrepreneurs and for potential employees. The basic
assumption underlying the community development bank is that all areas of
the country need banks that are clearly oriented toward the small deal: house-
holds that have a small net worth; a small IRA account; a small transactions
account; and businesses that need financing measured in thousands rather
than millions or billions of dollars. 
V. A Proposal for a Nationwide System of Community
Development Banks
Our proposal deviates from existing examples of CDB-type banks, and from
other proposals, by emphasizing the need for the development of an equitable
payment system for the bottom quintile of the population, which is generally
denied access to checking accounts or credit cards. More attention should be
given to this payment function of banking. Others have argued that commer-
cial banks should be required to provide “life-line accounts.”  We believe that
this represents an unnecessary cost that commercial banks can ill afford at the
present time. 
But by the same token, we recognize that it is important to bring the bottom
quintile of the population into the banking system without burdening them
with excessive costs associated with a “fee for services” payment mechanism.
The current credit card system, one example of a fee for services system,
forces those who cannot get credit cards (mainly those with lower incomes)
Community Development Banking
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do have credit cards: in general, there is no discount for payment by cash.
The current checking component of the payment system is too expensive for
commercial banks to provide the small accounts needed by those with low
incomes, and thus cannot serve as the basis of a universal payment system
available to all. The CDB system, however, can be designed so that a prof-
itable payment system is incorporated within the package of services provided
to the community.
We would expect that a fully funded and mature CDB would provide many
of the six functions of banking outlined earlier. However, these functions
may be implemented in phases. The payment system, secure outlets for sav-
ings, short-term commercial loans, mortgage loans, and student loans should
be included in the initial phase. Investment-type banking services and asset
management and advice for households could be added later. If the demon-
stration project (which begins with 100 CDBs) proves successful, we antici-
pate the creation of a nationwide system of CDBs that could provide all six
banking functions in selected communities (as each CDB finds its niche).
The CDB should rely to a great extent on local markets for its liabilities—this
is the inherent juxtaposition with the provision of small commercial loans.
This is in contrast to existing CDBs, which rely on funds from outside of their
communities. First, reliance on external sources of funds conflicts with the
goal of bringing the populations of depressed areas into the banking system.
Second, there is some evidence that reliance on external, brokered money
may have contributed to the thrift crisis (brokered money is volatile, and it
allowed some thrifts to grow too quickly). Instead, a maximum limit should
be set for external funds. This will help to ensure that local consumers receive
the broad range of financial services needed to encourage capital development
of the community. The depressed areas are great sources of funds (social
security checks, welfare payments, earnings, private pensions, and so on), but
these have been flowing into megabanks that use them elsewhere. Both the
assets and the liabilities of the CDBs should be regionally restricted. Thus,
CDBs should be permitted to hold no more than perhaps 10% of their assets
in the form of liabilities that originate outside the community. These would
likely consist primarily of federal government bonds. Local government obli-
gations would also form part of the CDB’s portfolio. The result will be a
mechanism to provide a source of funding to the local community.
Community Development Banking
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
PPB No. 3 new  2/17/99  3:19 PM  Page 15Creation of a Federal Bank for Community Development Banks
The funding, regulation, and supervision of CDBs can be carried out most
effectively by the creation of a federal bank for CDBs. The Federal Bank for
Community Development Banks (FBCDB) will be the central bank, the corre-
spondent bank, the link with financial markets, the supervising authority for
the community development banks, and it may provide some clearing ser-
vices. It will provide up to 50% of the equity for the community development
banks, and as an investor will have access to the books of these banks. This
FBCDB will also have responsibility for the development of the professional
staff of the CDBs. This would include training of staff, provision of informa-
tion, testing of competency, and so on.
The Federal Bank for Community Development Banks will be where the
community banks hold their reserve and their operating deposits. It will be
the correspondent bank for the community development banks—that is, the
FBCDB would help finance positions in assets and, in some cases, would take
shares in deals arranged by the CDBs. The “checks” that the community
bank makes available to the holders of savings deposits may well be nego-
tiable orders of withdrawal drawn on the Federal Bank. 
As the community development banks develop a mortgage business, the
Federal Bank would be the agency that securitizes these instruments. 
The Federal Bank will be responsible for establishing and maintaining under-
writing standards for the community development banks. It will have a train-
ing responsibility for the community banks, and be the link by which the
mortgages initiated by the community banks enter financial markets. Its over-
sight functions will exist by the right of its position as an owner. 
The Federal Bank for Community Development Banks will be started with an
initial investment of $1 billion by the Congress, which could be augmented to
$5 billion as and if the system warrants. It will report to the Congress. Its
directors and its chief executive officer will be nominated by the president
and confirmed by the Senate. It will have an initial ability to borrow up to
twice the federal government investment in the market. The bank is designed
to be profitable once the start-up period is over. For clearing purposes, this
bank will become a member of the Federal Reserve System, although some
clearing services may be provided by the FBCDB itself. The FBCDB will
match up to $10 million of private investment in each CDB. Because the
FBCDB is a major investor in each CDB, it will have representation on each
board, and as a co-investor will automatically have the right to inspect the
Community Development Banking
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Federal Reserve’s discount window to obtain reserves required in check clear-
ing between the CDB system and the commercial bank system. In short, the
FBCDB will combine the functions of a central bank, a correspondent bank,
and an investor for the CDBs.
The Payment System and Secure Outlets for Savings
Every payment system involves the use of resources and, therefore, involves
costs in operating the payment system. These costs have to be borne by some
sector of the economy. Access to a payment system may require an ability to
pay for the services used. The payment system has evolved into a three-part
structure: deposits subject to check; debit and credit cards; and currency and
coin. The deposit subject to check payment system is expensive and relatively
inefficient. To realize how inefficient our check payment system is, one need
simply trace the flow of bills and payments through the banking system and
note the number of records that are needed by the flow of payments and
orders. 
The costs of operating the checking system have been borne in a variety of
ways. Non-par clearing, where someone depositing or cashing a check
received less than the face value of the check under transaction, was a com-
mon practice for non-local checks prior to the Great Depression. In recent
years, the costs of the checking system were borne by the difference between
the interest paid on deposits and the interest earned on bank assets, where
access to the system without explicit service charges depended on the size of
the deposit balance. In addition, the Federal Reserve operates a check-clear-
ing service which in effect subsidizes the checking system. Over the years, the
checking system’s penetration grew, especially after the Savings and Loan
Associations and the other varieties of savings banks began to have deposits
that were subject to check (although coverage and access were never univer-
sal). 
Commercial banks are restricting access to checking accounts by setting
higher minimum balances, offering minimal customer relations, and leveling
explicit charges for account activity. The result is that larger segments of the
population are now outside the check-using system than hitherto, and this
trend of diminishing coverage by the check system can be expected to con-
tinue. (This is implied by the recent work of John Caskey, “Check-cashing
Outlets in the U.S. Financial System,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, November/December 1991.) 
Community Development Banking
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
PPB No. 3 new  2/17/99  3:19 PM  Page 17In contrast to the now increasingly overt costs of a checking account, the
costs of credit-debit card systems are carried by an annual fee and a covert
cost to the user in the form of the vendor’s discount. (The payment aspect of
the credit card should be distinguished from the credit aspect.) Furthermore,
of the three payment systems, only the credit-debit card system is capable of
being fully electronic: with a “smart” cash register, the “paper” that is signed
never leaves the place of origin unless a charge is challenged. There is little
doubt that an electronic plus plastic payment system will be of increasing
importance in the total payment system. The losses that banks and other
issuers of credit cards have taken in the current recession have led to closer
scrutiny, resulting in a restriction of access to the credit-debit card payment
mechanism. 
For many communities, the only available banking services are those that are
performed by the currency exchanges. These exchanges are a “fee for services
bank,” which cashes checks and provides payment services (e.g., money
orders) in exchange for currency (charging a 2–4% fee for their services). In
some jurisdictions, the currency exchanges are allowed to receive welfare and
social security checks. The currency exchanges show that the fee schedule for
making the exchange between currency and checking forms of money can
make the institution profitable. The situation was aptly described by
President Clinton:
“One community leader in Los Angeles told me that in that vast
place we know as the inner city, there were 177 check-cashing
stands in the neighborhood where the riots began and only thirty-
three banks. In the Washington, D.C., area, there are fifty major
banks but only two have branches in Anacostia and neither of
them has a lending office.”
The currency-exchange business should be one facet of the community devel-
opment banks. A recognition by the government that it is the payer’s respon-
sibility to pay its debts in a money form that the recipient can use implies that
the government needs to absorb the charges levied on recipients of its checks
for the exchange of checks for currency. This may require a payment by the
government of 1% of the face value to the CDBs that convert government
checks into currency. To reduce payment system costs, government payments
could be made directly to accounts at CDBs by wire transfers. 
If the now-existing currency exchanges were licensed to accept savings
accounts, and if they were required to hold only short-term government secu-
rities as assets for these accounts, they would be a savings equivalent of a nar-
row bank. Because their assets would be restricted to short-term government
Community Development Banking
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tee on their deposits regardless of the size of any deposit, without paying
deposit insurance premia to an agency such as the FDIC. 
These “narrow banks for savings” would solve the problem of the non-par
exchanges for some of the recipients of government checks. The deposit of
government checks into these accounts could well be an electronic transfer.
The CDBs would offer savings accounts that accept automatic deposits and
allow a limited number of withdrawals per month without explicit charges.
This would become a feasible way of offsetting the lack of elementary house-
hold banking services in poor neighborhoods. In addition, the savings facility
might allow a limited number of free, negotiable orders of withdrawal to be
written against these deposits; the rest would carry a service charge.
In order to protect against interest-rate risk, a 2.5% equity against such
deposits may be required. (Even if a vast majority of the assets are short-term
government securities, both the interest rate and default risk are minimal.)
The interest rate that these banks pay on their liabilities will be keyed to the
interest rate earned on the portfolio: we calculate that a 0.5 to 0.75% differ-
ential would make the savings facility profitable. 
The check-cashing and savings facility dimensions of the community develop-
ment banks cover the services to poorer households functions which these
banks are designed to perform. The NOW accounts would eliminate the rela-
tively substantial payment system costs incurred by the poorest members of
the community; low-income residents would be integrated into the banking
system, and it would be the first point of contact with a population in which
we wish to encourage thrift. 
Financing Housing and Consumer Debt
The community development banks will act as mortgage originators within
their community. They will not engage in construction loans through this
department. The mortgages will be on homes and minor community-level
commercial property. In many cases, mortgage loans will include provisions
for rehabilitation of property. Those mortgages that are carried will be
funded by long-term certificates of deposit through the commercial bank sub-
sidiary of the CDB, but as the banks develop it should be possible to securi-
tize such mortgages by way of facilities that the Federal Bank for Community
Development Banks will develop. 
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generally not available in the communities in which the development banks
will function. The community development banks will be able to make credit
cards available to those who have built up a savings account. The CDBs may
provide student loans and other loans for investment in human capital.
Commercial Banking Services
The CDBs will provide commercial loan services for their clients. These loans
will be financed by demand deposits, certificates of deposit, and other types
of deposits that will carry the ordinary deposit insurance. The development
and solicitation of business, the structuring of loans, and the supervision of
credits are three essential aspects of commercial banking. The bank’s staff for
commercial banking consists of business development and loan officers. In
smaller banks, these two functions may be combined, and the top manage-
ment is likely to be the key business development agent. 
The business development officers of a bank are just what the name indicates:
they are the salespeople of the bank’s services to the business community.
Like all salespeople, they work a territory. A community, even if it is under-
banked, has going businesses. The calling program of the business develop-
ment officers of a community development bank will necessarily include the
existing businesses in its neighborhood, whose needs will be explored. The
question of how the bank can serve the existing businesses, not perhaps as the
sole bank but as a supplement to existing banking connections, will be on the
“agenda” of the business development officer.
Being devoted to the community in which the businesses they are financing
function, the community development bank will, over time, develop a better
awareness of the potential successes and failures in their community than is
available to the branch officers of the larger traditional bank located outside
the community.
The structure of a financing agreement is what is finalized in the contract: a
bank’s customer promises to pay money at future dates in exchange for being
financed “now.” The structuring of loans begins with a “pro forma,” in
which the business sketches what it will do with the funds, and how the funds
to repay the loan will accrue to the business. The function of the loan office is
to apply a quizzical and skeptical eye to the presentation. In all these negotia-
tions, the ability of the loan applicant to perform is one question on the table.
Community Development Banking
Public Policy Brief 20
PPB No. 3 new  2/17/99  3:19 PM  Page 20Loan officers not only structure the loans, they often need to intervene to put
in place an adequate structure to administer the enterprise. 
Successful loan negotiations lead to an agreement on a scenario (program) for
the borrowing firm that yields the schedule of payments on the loan, along
with an understanding as to what will happen if various provisions of the
contract are not fulfilled. 
Supervision is the post-loan relation between a bank and its borrowing client.
The relation between a business and its bank is not a one-shot affair. In a suc-
cessful relationship, new credits are being negotiated even as maturing credits
are paid. The business development and loan officer’s relation with a bank
client includes follow-ups, which are designed to assure the bank that the
business is developing in such a way that the provisions of the loan are being
satisfied and the payments on the debts will be forthcoming. 
The success or failure of the community development bank concept will ride
on how well the solicitation, structuring, and supervision functions are car-
ried out. 
Given the character of banking, it is necessary that the usual loan committee
structure that includes outside directors to approve and review credits be
maintained. As banking is a highly leveraged business, it is essential that those
whose equity investment in the bank is at stake in the bank be represented on
these committees. The training and retention of business development and
loan officers is vital to the success of the community development bank con-
cept. 
Investment Banking Services
As was indicated in the discussion about commercial banking, community
development banks will quite naturally find that there are investment banking
activities that their clients require. In particular, a successful business may
require a faster growth in its equity than is allowed by the growth of equity
through retained earnings. The restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act would
not apply to these banks, for there is no feasible alternative to a community
development bank for raising the size of equity infusions that are contem-
plated. The dollar value of each underwriting that a community development
bank will undertake will fall below the usual minimum for underwritings by
investment bankers. 
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the equity and bond liabilities of clients. The position-taking may well be by
way of a venture capital fund, in which the bank joins with other investors.
Although community development banks will often be centered in a poor
neighborhood of a city, there are local firms (both service and manufacturing)
whose principals both know the community and have investable funds. Even
the poorest of our city neighborhoods are not communities that are univer-
sally impoverished. Our country has a long history of the successful develop-
ment of “immigrant banks” that served ethnic neighborhoods and helped
transform them from low-income to middle-income communities.
One aspect of the investment subsidiary of the community development bank
will be the development of the special knowledge needed about the businesses
with which it works: the investment subsidiary must be well versed in the
mechanics of qualifying for the various aids to small businesses (such as loan
programs of the Small Business Administration and other federal, state, and
local initiatives).
The Federal Bank for Community Development Banks, described earlier, may
well take positions in the equity of the community development banks. This
may be done directly or by way of venture capital funds it sponsors that may
be able to raise money on capital markets. 
The investment banking activities of the community development banks and
the Federal Bank for the Community Development Bank are natural out-
growths of the banking activities of these institutions. As the business devel-
opment and loan officers of the community banks “work their street,” they
not only identify and develop clients for the loan and the underwriting of the
bank, but they also develop knowledge of those in the community who are
able to invest in other businesses. The essential postulate of the community
development banking approach is that the poorer and under-banked parts of
our economy are not a 100% economic wasteland: that there are human,
entrepreneurial, and financial resources that can be developed. 
Asset Management Advice and Special Accounts
The advice that poorer people get about investment alternatives is usually
inaccurate and/or insufficient. The CDBs might develop a subsidiary that
advises its clients. There is, however, a potential conflict of interest if a CDB
were to give advice and sell its own liabilities to its customers. Hence, this
practice would be prohibited. The types of services that would be provided
Community Development Banking
Public Policy Brief 22
PPB No. 3 new  2/17/99  3:19 PM  Page 22would include advice concerning IRAs, pensions, and other retirement
income accounts.
Structure of a Community Development Bank
A CDB will be organized as a bank holding company under a special act of
Congress. The holding company will have a variety of structures. One exam-
ple is:
a . A narrow bank that includes a fee for service check-cashing operation and
a passbook savings facility. This narrow bank would be able to make
credit or debit cards available to its clients. 
b .A commercial bank that will also do mortgage financing. This commercial
bank will do ordinary commercial bank business for clients in its neighbor-
hood. Its funding would be by means of business checking accounts, house-
hold checking accounts, and certificates of deposit. 
c . An investment bank is a key subsidiary of a CDB. Its main function will be
to mediate in a process that furnishes equity and longer-term debt funding
to existing businesses as well as new businesses in its community. One
function of the business development and loan officers is to discover the
potential entrepreneurial resources in the community that require financ-
ing. Another will be to know the federal, state, and local agencies and laws
that aim to advance business development and to expedite and facilitate
their use.
d .A trust bank that would not only act as a Trustee for various custodial
activities (as required for every institution handling IRAs), but also operate
a financial advice facility.
Chartering and Financing of CDBs
The Congress will define the chartering process and activities of CDBs in leg-
islation that will also authorize the Federal Bank for Community
Development Banks. These banks will be a special category of federally char-
tered banks that will have powers and responsibilities beyond those granted
to either national or state banks. The chartering process needs to be simple:
entry should be relatively easy and not costly. The acceptance of rather close
supervision and guidance by the Federal Bank for Community Development
Banks will be a prerequisite for chartering. 
The financial parameters for a community development bank may well run
from a minimum private equity investment of $1 million to a maximum total
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may well be authorized or instructed to match the initial private investment,
up to a maximum of $5 million per CDB.
These limits are set because of the prudential rule that no single financing
relation should involve more than 10% of a bank’s capital and surplus. These
parameters make the maximum financing relation at the smallest of these
institutions $200,000, and the maximum at the largest $1 million. If we use
an 8.5% capital-to-asset ratio, the total footings of the CDBs will run from
$24 million to $120 million. However, as the “narrow bank” facility can
operate at a 40 to 1 ratio, a CDB that specializes in savings and payment
facilities could have as much as $400 million in total assets.
VI. The Role of Community Development Banking in the
American Economy
The Clinton/Gore proposal for community development banks called for
some 100 such banks over the next four years. Even if each of these banks
has assets of $100 million by 1996, the entire CDB network would total only
$10 billion. A set of financial institutions whose assets add up to $10 billion
is not very impressive in an American economy that will have a gross domes-
tic product much in excess of $6,000 billion by the time these institutions can
make a significant contribution to the prosperity of their area. 
A system of developed CDBs that relies on an initial equity investment by the
government would provide needed services to well-defined segments of the
household and business sectors. These segments are not being adequately
served. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the communities our
proposal targets are completely neglected by financial institutions. For
instance, check-cashing outlets are examples of profitable firms that provide
needed services to these communities. Our proposal would take advantage of
these examples and add additional services that are currently lacking in these
communities. In some cases, existing institutions, including credit unions,
may well evolve into CDBs that provide a broader range of services. In other
cases, new institutions will be created.
These institutions are not to be viewed as a significant countercyclical force,
nor as a major factor in the growth of the economy. They are to be seen as a
set of institutions that fill a gap in the ongoing institutional structure. They
may well provide part of the institutional setting in which a climate of oppor-
tunity replaces stagnation for many segments of the population. 
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